

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE**

STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE OF CONNECTICUT; STATE OF MARYLAND; STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW YORK; STATE OF OREGON; COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS; COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; and the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,

NO. \_\_\_\_\_

**COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY  
AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

## Plaintiffs,

V.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MICHAEL R. POMPEO, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS; MIKE MILLER, in his official capacity as Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Trade Controls; SARAH HEIDEMA, in her official capacity as Director of Policy, Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy; DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED; SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; AND CONN WILLIAMSON,

#### Defendants.

1 Plaintiffs the State of Washington, State of Connecticut, State of Oregon, State of  
 2 Maryland, State of New Jersey, State of New York, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,  
 3 Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia (the “States”) bring this lawsuit  
 4 against Defendants United States Department of State, Michael R. Pompeo, Directorate of  
 5 Defense Controls, Mike Miller, and Sarah Heidema (the “Government Defendants”); as well as  
 6 Defense Distributed, Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., and Conn Williamson.

## 7 I. INTRODUCTION

8 1. This case addresses the threat that downloadable guns, in the form of Computer  
 9 Aided Design (CAD) files for the automated production of firearms using a 3-D printer<sup>1</sup>, will  
 10 imminently be released on the internet, making these weapons available to virtually anyone. 3-D  
 11 printed guns are functional weapons that are often unrecognizable by standard metal detectors  
 12 because they are made out of materials other than metal (e.g., plastic) and untraceable because  
 13 they contain no serial numbers. Anyone with access to the CAD files and a commercially  
 14 available 3-D printer could readily manufacture, possess, or sell such a weapon—even those  
 15 persons statutorily ineligible to possess firearms, including violent felons, the mentally ill and  
 16 persons subject to protection and no-contact orders. This serious threat to the national security  
 17 and to public safety in the State of Washington was caused by the Federal Government’s covert  
 18 and *ultra vires* regulatory about-face, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)  
 19 and the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Until recently, the Federal Government  
 20 prohibited the distribution of CAD files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons  
 21 by including such files on the United States Munitions List (USML) and making them subject to  
 22 the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which are administered by the Directorate  
 23 of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) within the Department of State. As recently as April of this  
 24 year, the Government’s position was that if such CAD files were distributed via the internet, they

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<sup>1</sup> 3-D printing refers to technology that allows a person to make a three dimensional product using a digital file or software in conjunction with a printer that is directed by the software. See, e.g., <https://3dprinting.com/what-is-3d-printing/> (last visited July 30, 2018).

1 could be “easily used overseas to make firearms that are subject to U.S. export controls”, where,  
 2 “beyond the reach of U.S. law, they could be used to threaten U.S. national security, U.S. foreign  
 3 policy interests, or international peace and stability.”

4       2. In June 2018, however, the Government completely reversed its position on the  
 5 dissemination of the CAD files—not publicly or in accordance with a valid administrative  
 6 process, but by entering an under-the-radar settlement with a private company known as Defense  
 7 Distributed (DD). *Defense Distributed v. U.S. Dept. of State*, 15-CV-372 RP (W.D. Texas).  
 8 Defense Distributed’s stated objective is to ensure global, unrestricted access to firearms by  
 9 posting its CAD files online so that virtually everyone will have access to a “downloadable gun.”  
 10 As part of the Settlement Agreement, the Government promised to: (i) draft and fully pursue a  
 11 notice of rulemaking and a final rule to remove the CAD files at issue from ITAR jurisdiction;  
 12 (ii) temporarily modify Category I of the USML to exclude the files at issue from ITAR; (iii)  
 13 issue a letter to Defense Distributed advising that its files are exempt from ITAR and “approved  
 14 for public release (i.e., unlimited distribution)”; and (iv) permit “any United States person” to  
 15 “use, reproduce or otherwise benefit from” the files at issue.

16       3. On July 27, 2018, in accordance with the Settlement Agreement, DDTC  
 17 published a “Temporary Modification of Category I of the United States Munitions List” that  
 18 permits the dissemination of certain CAD files in Defense Distributed’s possession, including  
 19 files used to create undetectable and untraceable weapons, as well as a tabletop gun-milling  
 20 machine called the “Ghost Gunner.” This deregulation also applies to other files for the  
 21 automated production of 3-D printed weapons that may be developed or acquired by Defense  
 22 Distributed in the future.

1       4. Although the Government's deregulation of the CAD files in question is  
 2 nominally "temporary," it permits Defense Distributed's founder, self-described "crypto-  
 3 anarchist" Cody Wilson—and anyone else—to immediately disseminate the files by making  
 4 them available for download via the internet. Wilson and Defense Distributed have announced  
 5 that they intend to release the files on August 1, 2018. As of that point, the files will be,  
 6 practically speaking, irretrievable, because they will have been posted on the internet—a bell  
 7 that cannot be un-rung:




13  
 14 Source: <https://defcad.com> (accessed July 28, 2018).

15       5. The files that Defense Distributed intends to make available for download as of  
 16 August 1, 2018 include CAD files that can be used to manufacture a variety of weapons,  
 17 including AR-15 frames<sup>2</sup> and a 3-D printed pistol known as the "Liberator", as well as a  
 18 "computer-controlled milling machine" called the "Ghost Gunner," which is designed to allow  
 19 its owner to carve gun parts out of aluminum:  
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24       2 An AR-15 is a semi-automatic rifle that is the civilian equivalent of the M-16 and the weapon of choice  
 for many mass shooters.



Source: <https://defcad.com> (accessed July 28, 2018).

According to news reports,<sup>3</sup> the Defense Distributed website's repository of downloadable-gun files will also include "more exotic DIY semi-automatic weapons." "The relaunched site will be open to user contribution, too; Wilson hopes it will soon serve as a searchable, user-generated database of practically any firearm imaginable." According to Wilson: "What's about to happen is a Cambrian explosion of the digital content related to firearms." Wilson says: "All this Parkland stuff, the students, all these dreams of 'common sense gun reforms'? No. The internet will serve guns, the gun is downloadable . . . No amount of petitions or die-ins or anything else can change that."

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<sup>3</sup> Andy Greenberg, *A Landmark Legal Shift Opens Pandora's Box for DIY Guns*, (July 18, 2018) Wired, available at <https://www.wired.com/story/a-landmark-legal-shift-opens-pandoras-box-for-diy-guns/>, attached hereto as Ex. 1.

1       7.     The Government entered into the Settlement Agreement in contravention of the  
 2 statutes and regulations which govern the export designation process. Among other things, upon  
 3 information and belief, the State Department: (i) has not provided the relevant Congressional  
 4 committees with the required 30 days' notice to "temporarily" modify the USML or to achieve  
 5 the same thing via approval for public release of the information pursuant to 22 C.R.F.  
 6 §125.4(b)(13); (ii) has not received the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense to "temporarily"  
 7 change the designation of the files at issue; and (iii) has not followed established commodity  
 8 jurisdiction procedures before agreeing to "temporarily" exempt the CAD files at issue from  
 9 ITAR.

10       8.     The "temporary modification" of USML Category I and approval for public release  
 11 of the information pursuant 22 C.F.R. §125.4(b)(13) are especially troubling because it involves  
 12 making CAD files available on the internet, which largely overrides the later need to formally  
 13 modify the relevant rules. Moreover, the "temporary modification" on its face applies to recently  
 14 developed files that the Government has presumably not even seen or evaluated, as well as files  
 15 that may be developed in the future.

16       9.     In addition, the Government has acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and  
 17 has abused its discretion, by (i) failing to consider evidence relevant to ITAR jurisdiction over  
 18 the CAD files; (ii) drastically changing long-established practice and policy without any  
 19 explanation or sufficient notice; and (iii) failing to study the national- and state-security  
 20 implications of exempting the CAD files from ITAR. Upon information and belief, the  
 21 Government has made no determination regarding the national security implications of the  
 22 agreement, or its effects on sovereign U.S. states' ability to protect the safety of those within  
 23 their borders.

10. Tellingly, even the notices of proposed rules to amend the ITAR, which the Departments of State and Commerce published on May 24, 2018, make no mention of the dangers posed by the files falling into the hands of terrorist organizations, insurgent groups, transnational organized criminal organizations, or countries subject to the U.S. or U.N. arms embargoes.

11. The Government Defendants' unlawful actions—if allowed to stand—will lead to the proliferation of untraceable printed guns overseas and within the United States. Domestically, the proliferation of these guns also threatens to cripple the various States' extensive and comprehensive systems of firearms regulations designed to keep guns out of the wrong hands.

12. For all these reasons, and others detailed below, the Government Defendants have violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which reserves police power to the states. The Plaintiff States seek a declaration that the “temporary modification” of the USML Category I (which constitutes a final agency action) is invalid, and an injunction requiring the Government Defendants to rescind the temporary modification and refrain from acting in a manner inconsistent with such rescission.

## **II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

13. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter and the parties hereto pursuant to 28  
U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202.

14. Venue in this Court is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(e) because the Plaintiff is located here and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred or will imminently occur here. In particular, the dissemination of the CAD files in question will have an adverse impact on the public safety in the City of Seattle and King County, Washington, which are located in this district. *See* Declarations of King County Sheriff Mitzi Johanknecht

1 (attached hereto as Exhibit 2) and Seattle Police Chief Carmen Best (attached hereto as Exhibit  
 2 3). Also, Defendant Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. is located in Bellevue, Washington.

3                   **III. PARTIES**

4       15. The States of Washington, Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, New York,  
 5 Oregon, the Commonwealths of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania (Plaintiff States) and the  
 6 District of Columbia, represented by and through their respective Attorneys General, are  
 7 sovereign states of the United States of America. The security of the Plaintiff States is threatened  
 8 by the Government's deregulation of CAD files for the automated production of 3-D printed  
 9 weapons via the "temporary modification" of the USML Category I. The "temporary  
 10 modification" is also a direct attack on the State's sovereign power to protect the safety of those  
 11 within its borders, including the power to enact and enforce laws related to the ownership and  
 12 use of firearms.

13       16. Defendant the United States Department of State (State Department) is the  
 14 executive agency of the United States government responsible for administering and enforcing  
 15 the ITAR under the authority of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The State Department is  
 16 a party to the Settlement Agreement with Defense Distributed.

17       17. Defendant Michael R. Pompeo is sued in his official capacity as the Secretary of  
 18 State. In this capacity, he is responsible for the operation and management of the State  
 19 Department, including the operation and management of the Directorate of Defense Trade  
 20 Controls (DDTC) and administration and enforcement of the ITAR. The Secretary of State is a  
 21 party to the Settlement Agreement with Defense Distributed.

22       18. Defendant DDTC is a subordinate unit within the Department of State Bureau of  
 23 Political and Military Affairs responsible for administering and enforcing the ITAR. The DDTC

1 enacted the “temporary modification” of the USML Category I, and is a party to the Settlement  
 2 Agreement with Defense Distributed.

3       19. Defendant Mike Miller is sued in his official capacity as the Acting Deputy  
 4 Assistant Secretary of Defense Trade Controls. The Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary is a party  
 5 to the Settlement Agreement with Defense Distributed.

6       20. Defendant Sarah Heidema is sued in her official capacity as the Director, Office  
 7 of Defense Trade Controls Policy. The Director, Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy is a  
 8 party to the Settlement Agreement with Defense Distributed.

9       21. Defendant Defense Distributed is a Texas corporation whose headquarters and  
 10 principal place of business are located in Austin, Texas. Upon information and belief, Defense  
 11 Distributed advertises and sells items over the internet throughout the nation, including in  
 12 Washington. Defense Distributed also intends to make available for download from the internet  
 13 as of August 1, 2018 the CAD files at issue in this Complaint, and these downloads would be  
 14 available in Washington. Defense Distributed is a necessary party as the Settlement Agreement  
 15 that it entered into with the other Defendants may be affected by the requested relief, and this  
 16 may impede Defense Distributed’s interests under that Settlement Agreement.

17       22. Defendant Second Amendment Foundation, Inc. is a non-profit organization  
 18 incorporated under the laws of Washington with its principal place of business in Bellevue,  
 19 Washington. The Second Amendment Foundation is a necessary party as the Settlement  
 20 Agreement that it entered into with the other Defendants may be affected by the requested relief,  
 21 and this may impede the Second Amendment Foundation’s interests under that Settlement  
 22 Agreement.

23       23. Conn Williamson is a citizen of the State of Washington. Mr. Williamson is a  
 24 necessary party as the Settlement Agreement that he entered into with the other Defendants may

1      be affected by the requested relief, and this may impede Mr. Williamson’s interests under that  
 2      Settlement Agreement.

3                          **IV. ALLEGATIONS**

4                          **A. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework**

5                24.      The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2751 *et seq.*, authorizes the  
 6 President, “[i]n furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United  
 7 States . . . to control the import and the export of defense articles and defense services.”  
 8 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). The purpose of the AECA is to reduce the international trade in arms  
 9 and avoid destabilizing effects abroad through arms exports. 22 U.S.C. § 2751.

10               25.      Under the AECA, “[t]he President is authorized to designate those items which  
 11 shall be considered as defense articles and defense services for the purposes of this section and  
 12 to promulgate regulations for the import and export of such articles and services.” 22 U.S.C. §  
 13 2778(a)(1). Items designated as defense articles or services constitute the United States  
 14 Munitions List (USML). *Id.* at § 2778(a)(1). Category I of the USML lists articles, services,  
 15 and related technical data for “Firearms, Close Assault Weapons and Combat Shotguns.”

16               26.      Among other things, Category I of the USML includes all firearms up to .50  
 17 caliber, and all technical data directly related to such firearms. *See* 22 C.F.R. § 121.1(I)(a).  
 18 “Technical data” is information that “is required for the design, development, production,  
 19 manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance or modification of defense  
 20 articles.” *Id.* § 120.10(a). Technical data includes “information in the form of blueprints,  
 21 drawings, photographs, plans, instructions or documentation”. § 120.10.

22               27.      As former Director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls Management Lisa V.  
 23 Aguirre stated in a 2015 declaration filed in federal court, “the ‘technical data’ provisions serve  
 24 the purpose of limiting the export of detailed information needed to manufacture, maintain, or

1 operate defense articles controlled on the USML. *Defense Distributed v. U.S. Dept. of State*, 15-  
 2 CV-372 RP Dkt. 32-1 ¶ 14(d). Such export limitations advance the purposes of the AECA by  
 3 limiting the ability of foreign powers to design, develop, and produce defense articles in lieu of  
 4 being able to obtain those articles directly. Absent the inclusion of technical data in the ITAR,  
 5 the ITAR's limits on arms transfers would be of negligible practical effect because the ITAR  
 6 would leave unregulated the exportation of the fundamental technology, know-how, blueprints,  
 7 and other design information sufficient for foreign powers to construct, produce, manufacture,  
 8 maintain, and operate the very same equipment regulated in its physical form by the ITAR." *Id.*

9       28. Pursuant to Executive Order 13637, the President has delegated his AECA  
 10 authority to the State Department. In turn, the State Department has promulgated the ITAR,  
 11 which is administered by the DDTC. *See* 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130. Among other things, the DDTC  
 12 is tasked with maintaining, reviewing and clarifying the USML.

13       29. Pursuant to Executive Order 13637, section 1(n), "[d]esignations including  
 14 changes in designations, by the Secretary of items or categories that shall be considered as  
 15 defense articles and defense services subject to export control under section 38 (22 U.S.C. 2778)  
 16 shall have the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense."

17       30. In addition, the Executive Branch must give notice to the International Relations  
 18 Committee of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the  
 19 Senate at least 30 days in advance of removing an item from the USML. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(f)(1).  
 20 Such notification must be made in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming  
 21 notifications under section 634A(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2394-1.  
 22 *Id.*

23       31. Subject to the procedural requirements above and other provisions of AECA,  
 24 ITAR allows the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls to order the temporary

1 modification of any ITAR regulation. However, it may do so only “in the interest of the security  
 2 and foreign policy of the United States”—not merely as an interim measure before a final rule  
 3 can be passed. 22 C.F.R. § 126.2.

4       32. For situations where there is doubt that a particular item to be exported falls on  
 5 the USML, ITAR contains a commodity jurisdiction (CJ) procedure. 22 C.F.R. § 120.4. Upon  
 6 written request, the DDTC will provide a determination as to whether a certain item, service, or  
 7 data is within the jurisdiction of ITAR. *Id.*

8       33. As the Director Aguirre explained in her 2015 declaration, the CJ determination  
 9 “entails consultation among the Department of State, Defense, Commerce and other U.S.  
 10 Government agencies and industry in appropriate cases.” Ex. 4 ¶ 19. Assessments are made on  
 11 a case-by-case basis, evaluating whether the article is covered by the USML, is functionally  
 12 equivalent to an article on the USML, or has substantial military or intelligence application. A  
 13 determination made pursuant to the commodity jurisdiction process takes into account “(i) The  
 14 form and fit of the article; and (ii) The function and performance capability of the article.” Ex. 4  
 15 ¶ 20.

16       34. 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(f) requires that “State, Defense and Commerce will resolve  
 17 commodity jurisdiction disputes in accordance with established procedures. State shall notify  
 18 Defense and Commerce of the initiation and conclusion of each case.”

19 **B. The Defense Distributed CAD Files**

20       35. Defense Distributed is a Texas corporation founded by Cody Wilson, a self-  
 21 described “crypto-anarchist” who believes that “governments should live in fear of their  
 22 citizenry.” His company’s objective is for everyone in the world to have access to guns, and to  
 23 make meaningful gun regulation impossible.

1       36. In or around early May 2013, Defense Distributed posted CAD files on  
 2 DEFCAD.org, a website it created to serve as an open-source repository for weapons designs,  
 3 including software code used to automatically manufacture the “Liberator” pistol. The Liberator  
 4 is a plastic firearm which contains 6-oz piece of steel, which can be easily removed, enabling it  
 5 to avoid detection in walk-through metal detectors.

6       37. Defense Distributed described these CAD files as “essentially blueprints that can  
 7 be read by CAD software.” As the Federal Government stated in a court filing in April 2018,  
 8 these files are “indispensable to a three-dimensional (‘3-D’) printing process used to create  
 9 firearms and their components.” All a user would need to do is connect to a 3-D printer,  
 10 download the CAD files, and enter a print command, in order to create a real, functional weapon  
 11 within hours or minutes.

12       38. On May 8, 2013, the Office of Defense Trade Controls Compliance, which is  
 13 responsible for compliance with and civil enforcement of the AECA and ITAR, sent Defense  
 14 Distributed a letter noting that “it is unlawful to export any defense article or technical data for  
 15 which a license or written approval is required without first obtaining the required authorization  
 16 from the DDTC.” That letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 5. The letter explained that “disclosing  
 17 (including oral or visual disclosure) or transferring foreign data to a foreign person, whether in  
 18 the United States or abroad, is considered an export under § 120.17 of the ITAR.” It requested  
 19 that Defense Distributed remove ten specific CAD files from public access “immediately” and  
 20 advised that Defense Distributed could submit a request for CJ determination for the files.  
 21 Defense Distributed submitted a CJ determination request on June 21, 2015.

22       39. Separately, Defense Distributed submitted a CJ determination request for the  
 23 “Ghost Gunner,” an automated firearms metal milling machine. In April 2015, the DDTC  
 24 determined that the Ghost Gunner machine itself was not subject to the jurisdiction of the State

1 Department, but that the “project files and data files for producing a defense article on a 3D  
 2 printer or similar device constituted technical data on that defense article that would be subject  
 3 to ITAR regulation.”

4       40. The DDTC completed its review of Defense Distributed’s original requests on  
 5 June 4, 2015 and determined that six of those files were subject to ITAR control: (i) the  
 6 Liberator pistol; (ii) the .22 caliber electric pistol; (iii) the 5.56/.223 muzzle brake; (iv) the  
 7 Springfield XD- 40 tactical slide assemble; (v) the sub-caliber insert; and (vi) the VZ-58 front  
 8 sight.

9       41. In making its CJ determination, the DDTC noted that the CAD files could be used  
 10 to “automatically find, align, and mill” a defense article such as a firearm on a 3-D printer or  
 11 other manufacturing device, and that manufacture of a defense article in this way requires  
 12 considerably less know-how than manufacture in reliance on conventional technical data, which  
 13 merely *guides* the manufacture of a defense article and requires additional craftsmanship, know-  
 14 how, tools, and materials.

15 **C. Defense Distributed’s Lawsuit against the Federal Government**

16       42. In May 2015, Defense Distributed sued the Federal Government in a Texas  
 17 federal district court, seeking an injunction to prevent the Government from regulating Defense  
 18 Distributed’s dissemination of the CAD files. *Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dept. of State*,  
 19 15-CV-372 RP (W.D. Texas).

20       43. In defending against that lawsuit, the Government stated it was “particularly  
 21 concerned that [the] proposed export of undetectable firearms technology could be used in an  
 22 assassination, for the manufacture of spare parts by embargoed nations, terrorist groups, or to  
 23 compromise aviation security overseas in a manner specifically directed at U.S. persons.” As  
 24 the Government explained, the CAD files “are ‘technical data’ that are regulated by the ITAR

1 because, absent such regulation, providing the CAD designs to a foreign person or foreign  
 2 government would be equivalent to providing the defense article itself, enabling the complete  
 3 circumvention of ITAR's export regulations."

4       44. Along with its opposition to Plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion, the  
 5 Government submitted an affidavit from Lisa V. Aguirre, who was then the Director of the  
 6 Office of Defense Trade Controls Management. *See* Ex. 4, Dkt. 32-1. Among other things,  
 7 Director Aguirre stated that: (i) "[t]he 'Liberator' firearm included in DD's CAD designs  
 8 presents a specific and unique risk to the national security and foreign policy interests of the  
 9 United States"; (ii) making the CAD files available online would provide terrorist organizations  
 10 with firearms, which could be used against the United States or its allies; and (iii) "[a]ccess to  
 11 weapons technology coupled with the uncontrolled ubiquitous means of production . . . could  
 12 contribute to armed conflict, terrorist or criminal acts, and seriously undermine global export  
 13 control and non-proliferation regimes designed to prevent the dangerous and destabilizing spread  
 14 and accumulation of weapons and related technologies." Ex. 4 at ¶ 35(c).

15       45. The federal district court accepted the Government's arguments and declined to  
 16 preliminarily enjoin the Government's regulation of the CAD files. In doing so, the court found  
 17 that "[f]acilitating global access to firearms undoubtedly increases the possibility of outbreak or  
 18 escalation of conflict." *Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep't of State*, 121 F. Supp. 3d 680, 691  
 19 (W.D. Tex. 2015).

20       46. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to enjoin the  
 21 Government's enforcement efforts, focusing on both the national security implications of the  
 22 CAD files and the permanent nature of the internet:

23           Even if Plaintiffs—Appellants eventually fail to obtain a permanent injunction, the  
 24 files posted in the interim [if a preliminary injunction issued] would remain online  
 essentially forever, hosted by foreign websites such as the Pirate Bay and freely

1 available worldwide . . . ***Because those files would never go away***, a preliminary  
 2 injunction would function, in effect, as a permanent injunction as to all files  
 3 released in the interim. ***Thus, the national defense and national security interest***  
***would be harmed forever.***

4     *Def. Distributed v. United States Dep’t of State*, 838 F.3d 451, 461 (5th Cir. 2016) (emphasis  
 5 added).

6         47. On January 8, 2018, the Supreme Court denied Defense Distributed’s petition for  
 7 a writ of certiorari. *Def. Distributed v. Dep’t of State*, 138 S. Ct. 638 (2018).

8         48. After the district court lifted the stay of proceedings that had been imposed  
 9 pending the above-referenced appeals, the Government in April 2018 moved to dismiss Defense  
 10 Distributed’s complaint, arguing that the CAD files at issue “can unquestionably facilitate the  
 11 creation of defense articles abroad” and that “the Department of State has consistently and  
 12 reasonably concluded that it is not possible to meaningfully curtail the overseas dissemination  
 13 of arms if unfettered access to technical data essential to the production of those arms is  
 14 permitted.” If the Government were not permitted to regulate the dissemination of the CAD  
 15 files, it argued, “they could be used to threaten U.S. national security, U.S. foreign policy  
 16 interests, or international peace and stability.”

17         49. Mere weeks after the Government moved to dismiss, Wilson and Defense  
 18 Distributed abruptly announced that their case had settled. According to news reports, “the  
 19 government surprised the plaintiffs by suddenly offering them a settlement with essentially  
 20 everything they wanted.”<sup>4</sup> On July 27, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with  
 21 prejudice.

#### 22         D. The Government’s Settlement Agreement with Defense Distributed

23         50. The Settlement Agreement was apparently finalized in April 2018, but was not  
 24 executed by the parties until June 29, 2018, and was not made public until July 10, 2018. A true  
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<sup>4</sup> Exhibit 1

1 and correct copy of the Settlement Agreement, which is published on DDTC's website  
 2 (<https://www.pmddtc.state.gov>), attached hereto as Exhibit 6.

3 51. Pursuant to Paragraph 1 of the Settlement Agreement, the Government  
 4 Defendants have committed to:

5       a.     “draft and . . . fully pursue, to the extent authorized by law (including the  
 6           Administrative Procedure Act), the publication in the Federal Register of a notice of  
 7           proposed rulemaking and final rule, revising USML Category I to exclude the technical  
 8           data that is the subject of the [Defense Distributed] Action”;

9       b.     “announce[ ], while the above-referenced rule is in development, . . . a  
 10           temporary modification, consistent with [ITAR], of USML Category I to exclude the  
 11           technical data that is the subject of the Action . . . on or before July 27, 2018”;

12       c.     “issu[e] . . . a letter to Plaintiffs on or before July 27, 2018, signed by the  
 13           Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls, advising that the Published Files,  
 14           Ghost Gunner Files, and CAD Files<sup>5</sup> are approved for public release (i.e., unlimited  
 15           distribution) in any form and are exempt from the export licensing requirements of the  
 16           ITAR”; and

17       d.     “acknowledge[ ] and agree[ ] that the temporary modification of USML  
 18           Category I permits any United States person . . . to access, discuss, use, reproduce, or  
 19           otherwise benefit from the technical data that is the subject of the Action, and that the

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20  
 21       <sup>5</sup> These terms are defined as follows, by reference to Defense Distributed’s complaint:  
 22       • “Published Files”: “technical information regarding a number of gun-related items, including a  
 23           trigger guard, grips, two receivers, a magazine for AR-15 rifles, and a handgun”.  
 24       • “Ghost Gunner Files”: “files containing technical information on a machine, named the “Ghost  
          Gunner,” that can be used to manufacture a variety of items, including gun parts”.  
      • “CAD Files”: files which Defense Distributed has made requests to the Department of Defense  
          Office of Prepublication Review and Security for prepublication review since September 2, 2014.

1 letter to Plaintiffs permits any such person to access, discuss, use, reproduce or otherwise  
 2 benefit from the Published Files, Ghost Gunner Files, and CAD Files.”

3 52. Importantly, Paragraphs 1(a), (b), and (d) of the Settlement Agreement apply to  
 4 “the technical data that is the subject of the Action,” which is defined to include “Other Files,”  
 5 i.e., those that “Defense Distributed has and will continue to create and possess . . . that contain  
 6 technical information, to include design drawings, rendered images, written manufacturing  
 7 instructions.” In other words, they include existing files that the Government presumably has not  
 8 seen or evaluated, as well as files that may be created or acquired by Defense Distributed in the  
 9 future.

10 53. There is no indication in the Settlement Agreement (or elsewhere) that any  
 11 analysis, study or determination was made by the Government Defendants, in consultation with  
 12 other agencies, before the Government agreed to remove the CAD Files from the USML  
 13 Category I. In fact, the Settlement Agreement states that it “does not reflect any agreed-upon  
 14 purpose other than the desire of the Parties to reach a full and final conclusion of the Action, and  
 15 to resolve the Action without the time and expense of further litigation.” Ex. 6 ¶ 5.

16 54. Upon information and belief, neither the House Committee on Foreign Relations  
 17 nor the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations received the required 30 days’ advance notice  
 18 of the “temporary modification” referenced in Paragraphs 1(b) or (d) of the Settlement  
 19 Agreement. The temporary modification went into effect on July 27, 2018, without providing  
 20 any such notice to Congress.

21 55. In addition, there is no indication in the Settlement Agreement (or elsewhere) that  
 22 the Secretary of Defense has concurred in the changes to designation to which the Government  
 23 Defendants committed, as required by Executive Order 13637. There is also no indication that  
 24

1       the Government Defendants have followed the established procedures for making a CJ  
 2 determination before allowing Defense Distributed to disseminate its CAD files.

3       56. Since the Settlement Agreement became public, Cody Wilson and Defense  
 4 Distributed have repeatedly and adamantly claimed that the “temporary modification” pursuant  
 5 to the Settlement Agreement will effectively negate all gun violence prevention efforts. Among  
 6 other things, Wilson tweeted a photo of a tombstone announcing the death of “gun control,” and  
 7 stated: “All this Parkland stuff, the students, all these dreams of ‘common sense gun reforms’?  
 8 No. The internet will serve guns . . . No amount of petitions or die-ins or anything else can  
 9 change that.” *See* Ex. 1.

10      **E. The Government’s Actions in Accordance with the Settlement Agreement**

11       57. On May 24, 2018, as promised, the Government published notices of proposed  
 12 rulemaking by the State and Commerce Departments, which would remove Plaintiffs’ CAD files  
 13 from the USML Category I. *See* International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List  
 14 Categories I, II, and II, 83 Fed. Reg. 24,198 (May 24, 2018); Control of Firearms, Guns,  
 15 Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under  
 16 the United States Munitions List (USML), 83 Fed. Reg. 24,166 (May 24, 2018).

17       58. According to the Department of State’s Notice of Proposed Rule, it “is engaged  
 18 in an effort to revise the U.S. Munitions List so that its scope is limited to those defense articles  
 19 that provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence advantage or, in the case of  
 20 weapons, are inherently for military end use.” According to the State Department, the articles  
 21 that would be removed from the list “do not meet this standard.” For this reason, the notice  
 22 proposes to remove all non-automatic firearms up to .50 caliber (and any related technical data)  
 23 from the USML under the jurisdiction of the State Department, and move jurisdiction over these  
 24

1 products over to the Commerce Department, which, due to its looser export controls,<sup>6</sup> do not  
 2 typically take action to prohibit the publication of the data.

3       59. The Department of Commerce's Proposed Rule, filed the same day, describes  
 4 how its Export Administration Regulations (EAR) will apply to items no longer controlled under  
 5 the USML. Although the Department of Commerce would not comprehensively restrict the  
 6 export of technology related to firearms, it would have authority to impose a restriction on a  
 7 case-by-case basis if it determines the export would be contrary to the national security or foreign  
 8 policy interests of the United States, the promotion of human rights, or regional stability.  
 9 *See* 15 C.F.R. § 742.6. But the Department of Commerce cannot restrict the export of technology  
 10 already in the public domain, including through posting on publicly available sites on the  
 11 internet. *See* 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.3(b)(3), 734.7(a)(4). If the Government Defendants' improper  
 12 deregulation of the CAD files at issue is not enjoined, and Defense Distributed makes its  
 13 repository of files available online, the Department of Commerce will be unable to make an  
 14 independent determination about whether national security or other concerns warrant restricting  
 15 the unlimited dissemination of those files in accordance with the EAR.

16       60. The public comment period for both notices concluded on July 9, 2018, the day  
 17 before the Settlement Agreement became public.

18       61. On July 27, 2018, as promised, DDTC published a notice on its website entitled  
 19 "Temporary Modification of Category I of the United States Munitions List." attached hereto as  
 20 Ex. 7. This notice states that "the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Trade Controls  
 21 has determined that it is in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the United States to  
 22  
 23

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24       <sup>6</sup> ITAR requires any exporter of items on the USML to register with the State Department, *see* 22 C.F.R.  
 122.1(a), but Commerce Department regulations include no similar registration requirement.

1 temporarily modify United States Munitions List (USML) Category I to exclude” the technical  
 2 data described in the Settlement Agreement.

3       62. Upon information and belief, the Government did not actually “determine” that  
 4 “it is in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the United States” to permit the global  
 5 dissemination of CAD files that can be used to automatically manufacture undetectable and  
 6 untraceable weapons. The notion that *removal* of an item from the USML is in the national  
 7 security interest defies common sense. This statement also contradicts the Settlement  
 8 Agreement, which provides that the parties’ agreement thereto does not “reflect any agreed-upon  
 9 purpose other than the desire of the Parties to reach a full and final conclusion of the Action, and  
 10 to resolve the Action without the time and expense of further litigation.”

11       63. In sum, the Government’s covert agreement to deregulate the CAD files by way  
 12 of the Settlement Agreement—which culminated in the enactment of the “temporary  
 13 modification” on July 27, 2018—are final agency decisions that not only failed to comply with  
 14 procedural requirements, but that have far-reaching implications for national security and the  
 15 safety and security of the State and people of Washington.

#### 16       F. Adverse Effects on the States’ Public Safety Laws

17       64. Each of the States in this matter have extensive and comprehensive statutory and  
 18 regulatory schemes regarding firearms. The aim of the States’ laws is the same: To protect the  
 19 public by keeping guns out of the hands of those who should not possess them – minors,  
 20 convicted felons, the mentally ill, and those subject to protective and no-contact orders. The  
 21 States’ ability to protect the public will be seriously undermined if the Government’s action is  
 22 allowed to stand because the Government’s action will allow anyone – including those ineligible  
 23 to possess firearms – to easily obtain untraceable guns by simply printing them.

1           **1. Washington's Firearms Laws**

2       65. The State of Washington has a comprehensive statutory scheme regulating the  
3 possession, licensing, registration, and use of firearms and dangerous weapons.

4       66. These laws promote public safety by keeping guns out of the hands of those who,  
5 for various reasons, should not have access to them, including minors, persons convicted of  
6 violent felonies, the mentally ill, and persons subject to various protection and no-contact orders.

7       67. As noted, Cody Wilson's express intent is to eviscerate *any* regulation of firearms  
8 by providing to anyone—including the categories of persons just mentioned—the ability to  
9 easily manufacture firearms that can evade metal detectors, are untraceable because they carry  
10 no markings, and shoot bullets that cannot be forensically linked to the gun. The Government  
11 Defendants' unlawful action in removing from the USML CAD files like those Mr. Wilson  
12 intends to disseminate will allow Mr. Wilson and others like him to achieve their dream.

13       68. Indeed, the Government Defendants' unlawful action will effectively cripple  
14 Washington's ability to enforce its firearm and dangerous weapons regulations—to the great  
15 detriment of the public and public safety.

16       69. Washington law prohibits certain persons from obtaining or possessing firearms.  
17 For example, persons cannot possess firearms if they have been convicted or found not guilty by  
18 reason of insanity of crimes including serious felony offenses and certain crimes committed by  
19 one family member against another (e.g., stalking, reckless endangerment, coercion). Wash Rev.  
20 Code §§ 9.41.040(1), (2)(a)(i)-(ii). Persons subject to a variety of protection and no contact  
21 orders are also prohibited from possessing firearms.<sup>7</sup> Wash Rev. Code § 9.41.040(2)(a)(iii).  
22 Persons who have been involuntarily committed for mental health treatment may not possess

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23       7 These include sexual assault protection orders (Wash Rev. Code 7.90), stalking protection orders (Wash.  
24 Rev. Code 7.92), anti-harassment protection orders (Wash Rev. Code 10.14), and domestic violence protection  
orders (RCW 26.50).

1 firearms. Wash Rev. Code § 9.41.040(2)(a)(iv). Finally, persons under the supervision of the  
 2 Washington Department of Corrections cannot possess firearms or ammunition. Wash Rev.  
 3 Code § 9.41.045.

4       70. Washington law also has set up an extensive system of rules to ensure these  
 5 persons cannot buy firearms. For example, a person who applies to buy a pistol from a dealer  
 6 must provide a laundry list of information, including his or her name, residential address, date  
 7 and place of birth, driver's license number or state identification card number, and statement that  
 8 the buyer is eligible under Washington law to possess the gun, as well as a description of the  
 9 gun, including the make, model, caliber and manufacturer's number. Wash Rev. Code §  
 10 9.41.090(5). The dealer cannot deliver the pistol to the buyer, even if he or she is eligible to  
 11 possess the gun, unless the manufacturer's number for the gun is recorded on the application and  
 12 transmitted to the local police chief or sheriff where the buyer lives. *Id.* The dealer must keep a  
 13 record in a book of each pistol sold, including information about the person buying the weapon  
 14 (e.g., name, address, etc.) and the weapon (e.g., caliber, make, model and manufacturer's  
 15 number), and the book must be signed by both the buyer and the dealer in one another's presence.  
 16 Wash Rev. Code § 9.41.110(9)(a). The dealer is also obligated to give to the buyer a copy of a  
 17 pamphlet advising the buyer of legal restrictions on the use of firearms and firearms safety. Wash  
 18 Rev. Code § 9.41.090(5) (year).

19       71. One of the cornerstones of Washington's firearms regulatory structure is the use  
 20 of background checks. Essentially all sales or transfers of firearms in Washington are subject to  
 21 background checks.<sup>8</sup> Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.113(1). This includes not just sales by dealers, but  
 22 also sales or transfers at gun shows and online. *Id.* Even sales or transfers between unlicensed  
 23

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24       <sup>8</sup> The exceptions to this rule are extremely limited (e.g., transfers between immediate family members,  
 antique firearms, to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm, etc.). RCW 9.41.113(4).

1 parties must be run through a licensed dealer in order to ensure that a background check is  
 2 completed. Wash Rev. Code § 9.41.113(3). The purpose of the background check is simple and  
 3 obvious: to ensure that persons prohibited by law from possessing firearms are unable to do so.

4       72. The Government’s “temporary modification” of the USML Category I to permit  
 5 “any United States person” to “access, discuss, use, reproduce, or otherwise benefit from” CAD  
 6 files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons quite literally nullifies the State of  
 7 Washington’s laws prohibiting certain categories of persons from possessing firearms.

8       73. If the “temporary modification” is left in place, the State of Washington stands to  
 9 suffer extreme and irreparable harm. Persons ineligible to possess firearms under Washington  
 10 law will easily be able to obtain downloadable guns that they can produce at home using a 3-D  
 11 printer. Washington law enforcement will have no means of detecting such weapons using  
 12 standard equipment such as metal detectors, and no means of tracing such weapons because they  
 13 have no serial numbers.

14       74. 3-D printers are widely available to the general public in Washington. For  
 15 example, Amazon has hundreds of 3-D printers on its website for sale to the public. In addition,  
 16 such printers are widely accessible at Washington colleges and universities, including the  
 17 University of Washington in Seattle. *See, e.g.*, <https://itconnect.uw.edu/learn/workshops/3d-printing-consultation/> (University of Washington); <https://vcea.wsu.edu/fiz/3d-printing/> (Washington State University); <https://www.cwu.edu/multimodal-education/3d-printing> (Central Washington University).

21       75. The dangers posed by the Government’s actions that will allow the imminent  
 22 dissemination of the technology needed to print guns is recognized by two of Washington’s  
 23 preeminent law enforcement officers, Seattle Police Chief Carmen Best and King County Sheriff  
 24 Mitzi Johanknecht. As Sheriff Johanknecht attests, “Ghost guns are an extreme risk to public

1 safety that would disrupt the ability of law enforcement to conduct, solve and prevent violent  
 2 crimes.” Ex. 2 ¶ 8.

3       76. In sum, the Government’s actions are an extreme infringement on the State of  
 4 Washington’s sovereign right to enact and enforce its public safety laws.

5           **2. Connecticut’s Firearms Laws**

6       77. Connecticut comprehensively regulates the possession, sale and transfer of all firearms  
 7 within and into the state and bans the most dangerous military-style firearms completely. It also regulates  
 8 the classes of people who may lawfully possess otherwise lawful firearms and prohibits individual from  
 9 possessing firearms who pose the most serious threat to public safety, and in some instances, themselves.

10           **a. Connecticut’s regulation of all lawful firearm owners**

11       78. In Connecticut, people who wish to possess handguns—pistols or revolvers—are  
 12 required to have a valid pistol permit; an eligibility certificate to purchase pistols or revolvers; an  
 13 eligibility certificate to purchase long guns, or a be a police officer or one of the exemption listed in  
 14 law. Not everyone who wishes to have a pistol permit in Connecticut is granted one; he or she must be a  
 15 person is a suitable person to receive such permit. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 29-28. Individuals who wish  
 16 to possess a pistol or revolver must satisfy basic safety training requirements. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §  
 17 29-36f(b); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28 (b).

18           **b. Connecticut’s regulation of sale, purchase and transfer of possession  
                  of all firearms, even between lawful firearm owners**

19       80. Connecticut closely regulates the sale and transfer of all firearms, even between  
 20 lawful firearm owners. In Connecticut, no person, firm or corporation shall sell, deliver or  
 21 otherwise transfer any pistol or revolver to any person who is prohibited from possessing a pistol  
 22 or revolver. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(a). The purchaser of a pistol or revolver must have a valid  
 23 permit to carry a pistol or revolver. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(b). Compliance with these  
 24 requirements is ensured by requiring all sales or transfers of pistols or revolvers in Connecticut

1 be made through a process established by the Connecticut Department Emergency Services and  
 2 Public Protection. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-33(c).

3       81. Similarly, Connecticut regulates the sale and transfer of long guns such as rifles  
 4 and shotguns. All parties to such transfers must ensure, through a process established by the  
 5 Connecticut Department Emergency Services and Public Protection, that the purchaser of the  
 6 long gun has a valid long gun eligibility certificate that has not been revoked or suspended. Conn.  
 7 Gen. Stat. § 29-36l(f).

8       82. Connecticut regulation also restricts how many firearms a person can sell as year  
 9 without becoming a federally licensed firearm dealer or obtaining a permit. Conn. Gen. Stat.  
 10 § 29-28.

11       83. Unlike many states, Connecticut's firearm regulations extend to the sales,  
 12 transfers or exchanges taking place at "gun shows." Connecticut requires that gun show sellers  
 13 obtain an authorization number from the Connecticut Special Licensing and Firearms Unit.  
 14 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-37g(c).

15                   **c. Connecticut's prohibition on possession of a firearm by certain  
 16 persons**

17       84. Connecticut prohibits certain persons from obtaining or possessing firearms. For  
 18 example, persons cannot possess firearms if they have been convicted or found not guilty by  
 19 reason of insanity of crimes including serious felony offenses and certain crimes committed by  
 20 one family member against another Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-217. No person convicted for a  
 21 Felony or a Misdemeanor crime of domestic violence involving the use or threatened use of  
 22 physical force or a deadly weapon may possess any firearms in Connecticut. Conn. Gen. Stat.  
 23 § 29-36f(b); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28 (b).

24       85. The types of crimes that render someone ineligible to possess a firearm in

1 Connecticut are wide ranging and include: 1) illegal possession of narcotics or other controlled  
 2 substances; 2) criminally negligent homicide; 3) assault in the third degree ; 4) Assault of a  
 3 victim 60 or older in the third degree; 5) threatening; 6) reckless endangerment in the first degree;  
 4 7) unlawful restraint in the second degree; 8) riot in the first degree; 9) riot in the second degree;  
 5 10) Inciting to riot; 11) stalking in the second degree; or 12) anyone who has been convicted as  
 6 delinquent for the commission of a serious juvenile offense, or 13) anyone who has been  
 7 discharged from custody within the preceding twenty years after having been found not guilty  
 8 of a crime by reason of mental disease or defect; 14) anyone who has been confined in a hospital  
 9 for persons with psychiatric disabilities within the preceding sixty months by order of a probate  
 10 court; 15) anyone who has been voluntarily admitted to a hospital for persons with psychiatric  
 11 disabilities within the preceding six months for care and treatment of a psychiatric disability and  
 12 not solely for alcohol or drug dependency; or 15) anyone who is subject to a firearms seizure  
 13 order issued pursuant to Connecticut General Statute Section 29-38c after notice and an  
 14 opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person; 16) anyone who is an alien illegally  
 15 or unlawfully in the United States; 17) anyone who satisfies any of the federal disqualifiers listed  
 16 in Title 18 U.S.C Chapter 44. *See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-28(b); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36f(b).*

17       86.     Connecticut also prohibits a person under the age of 21 years of age from  
 18 obtaining a pistol or revolver. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 29-36f(a).

19                   **d.     Connecticut's regulation of assault weapons and machine guns**

20       87.     Connecticut prohibits the possession of an assault weapon or any "part or  
 21 combination of parts" that can be readily assembled into an assault weapon, Conn. Gen. Stat.  
 22 § 53-202c unless the owner obtained a Certificate of Possession prior to January 1, 2014.  
 23 Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202d.

24       88.     Any Connecticut resident who owns a fully automatic weapon or machine gun is

1 required to complete a state form registering that firearm with Connecticut immediately upon  
 2 receiving it, and upon an annual basis. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53-202(g).

3       89. The Government’s “temporary modification” of the USML Category I to permit  
 4 “any United States person” to “access, discuss, use, reproduce, or otherwise benefit from” CAD  
 5 files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons quite literally nullifies the State of  
 6 Connecticut’s laws prohibiting certain categories of persons from possessing firearms.

7       90. If the “temporary modification” is left in place, the State of Connecticut stands to  
 8 suffer extreme and irreparable harm. Persons ineligible to possess firearms under Connecticut  
 9 law will easily be able to obtain downloadable guns that they can produce at home using a 3-D  
 10 printer. Connecticut law enforcement will have no means of detecting such weapons using  
 11 standard equipment such as metal detectors, and no means of tracing such weapons because they  
 12 have no serial numbers.

13       91. In sum, the Government’s actions are an extreme infringement on the State of  
 14 Connecticut’s sovereign right to enact and enforce its public safety laws.

15       **3. Maryland’s Firearms Laws**

16       92. The State of Maryland has one of the most robust firearms regulatory regimes in  
 17 the country. For instance, Maryland prohibits certain categories of persons from buying or  
 18 possessing a firearm. This includes minors under the age of 21, and persons previously convicted  
 19 of certain serious crimes, including crimes of violence. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-133.  
 20 Persons who have been involuntarily committed to a mental health facility, or are under the  
 21 protection of a court-appointed guardian, or have been found incompetent to stand trial, or are  
 22 addicted to a controlled dangerous substance, or are subject to a protective order are all  
 23 prohibited from possessing a firearm as well. *Id.*

24       93. Sales and other transfers of firearms in Maryland are extensively regulated to

1 ensure that prohibited persons are unable to obtain a weapon. A person seeking to purchase, rent,  
 2 or receive a handgun must first obtain a handgun qualification license. Md. Code Ann., Pub.  
 3 Safety § 5-117.1. To obtain such a license, applicants must, among other things, make a sworn  
 4 statement that they are not prohibited under federal or State law from possessing a handgun, pass  
 5 a fingerprint-based background check, and complete an approved firearms safety training course.  
 6 *Id.* Further, a person must submit a firearm application before the person purchases, rents, or  
 7 transfers a handgun in Maryland. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety §§ 5-117, 5-118. That transaction  
 8 must be executed within 90 days of the application's approval and must be reported to the State  
 9 Police, including a description of the firearm and its serial number. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety  
 10 § 5-123. Firearm dealers are required to maintain records of every transaction, including the  
 11 name and address of the purchaser, a precise description, including make, model, caliber, and  
 12 serial number of each firearm acquired or sold, and the date of sale. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety  
 13 § 5-145. Further, persons moving to Maryland from out-of-state must register their firearms with  
 14 the State Police, which requires the applicant to submit information such as their name, address,  
 15 and Social Security number, as well as the make, model, and manufacturer's serial number of  
 16 the firearm. Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-143.

17       94. Maryland also prohibits the possession of certain types of firearms. Assault  
 18 weapons, including assault pistols, may not be bought, possessed, sold, or transported into the  
 19 State. Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law § 4-303. Detachable magazines with a capacity of more than  
 20 ten rounds of ammunition are also prohibited from being bought, sold, or possessed. Md. Code  
 21 Ann., Crim. Law § 4-305.

22       95. Maryland's carefully constructed regulatory regime will be upended if the  
 23 Government's action is permitted to stand. Persons currently prohibited from possessing  
 24 firearms would be able to easily circumvent Maryland law by simply manufacturing a gun on a

1     3-D printer. The firearms thus produced will be unregistered, unmarked, and virtually  
 2     untraceable, directly harming Maryland's interest in a well-regulated firearms market and  
 3     potentially leading to an increase in violent crime.

4                  **4.      New Jersey's Firearms Laws**

5         96.     New Jersey not only has statutes related to the purchase and possession of guns,  
 6     but also laws relating to who can manufacture firearms. In New Jersey, under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-9,  
 7     it is illegal to manufacture a weapon without being registered or licensed to do so. And N.J.S.A.  
 8     2C:39-10 makes it a crime to knowingly violate the regulatory provision relating to the  
 9     manufacturing of firearms in N.J.S.A. 2C:58-1, which provides that every manufacturer of  
 10    firearms shall register with the proper State authorities. Yet Defense Distributed's codes would  
 11    enable individuals to manufacture guns, without a license, using a 3D printer at home, no matter  
 12    what state law says – and indeed, founder Cody Wilson has celebrated this result.

13         97.     New Jersey also has an extensive system of rules for people purchasing firearms.  
 14    A person must obtain a firearms purchaser identification card before purchasing, receiving, or  
 15    otherwise acquiring a firearm. Under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c), the following people are prohibited  
 16    from obtaining a purchaser identification card, and thus prohibited from purchasing  
 17    firearms: those who have been convicted of crimes and disorderly persons offenses involving  
 18    acts of domestic violence (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(1)); those who are drug dependent (N.J.S.A.  
 19    2C:58-3(c)(2)); those who are confined for mental disorders to hospitals, mental institutions or  
 20    sanitariums (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(2)); those who suffer from a physical defect or disease that  
 21    would make it unsafe for him to handle firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3)); those who have been  
 22    confined for a mental disorder (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(3)); those who are alcoholics and are unable  
 23    to produce proof demonstrating that they no longer suffer from that particular disability in a  
 24    manner that would interfere with or handicap them in the handling of firearms (N.J.S.A.

1      2C:58-3(c)(3)); juveniles (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(4)); those for whom the issuance of a permit to  
 2 purchase a handgun or firearms purchaser identification card would not be in the interests of the  
 3 public health, safety, or welfare (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5)); those who are subject to restraining  
 4 orders issued pursuant to the “Prevention of Domestic Violence Act” prohibiting them from  
 5 possessing firearms (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(6); those who were adjudicated delinquent for offenses  
 6 which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime involving the unlawful use or  
 7 possession of weapons, explosives, or destructive devices (N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(7)); those who  
 8 had a firearm seized pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A.  
 9 2C:58-3(c)(8)); and those who are named on the consolidated Terroristic Watchlist maintained  
 10 by the Terrorist Screening Center administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (N.J.S.A.  
 11 2C:58-3(c)(9)). And New Jersey bans all assault weapons. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(f).

12        98. Finally, New Jersey law prohibits “certain persons” from purchasing, owning,  
 13 possessing, or controlling any and all firearms under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b), due to their prior  
 14 convictions for aggravated assault, arson, burglary, escape, extortion, homicide, kidnapping,  
 15 robbery, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, bias intimidation, endangering the welfare of  
 16 a child, stalking, or a crime involving domestic violence. Those persons face a mandatory term  
 17 of imprisonment with at least five years of parole ineligibility if they purchase, own, possess, or  
 18 control a firearm. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).

19            **5. New York’s Firearms Laws**

20        99. For over a century, in order to promote public safety, New York law has regulated  
 21 the possession and use of guns and has prohibited certain persons from obtaining or possessing  
 22 firearms. *See* NY Penal Law §§ 265.00, 265.01, 265.20(a)(3), 400.00; *Kachalsky v. Cty. of*  
*23 Westchester*, 701 F.3d 81, 84 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013). For example,  
 24 New York licenses the possession of “firearms,” which are defined, as a general matter, as any

1 pistol or revolver; a shotgun having one or more barrels less than eighteen inches in length; a  
 2 rifle having one or more barrels less than sixteen inches in length; and any assault weapon.  
 3 See NY Penal Law §§ 265.01, 265.20(a)(3), 400.00. These measures remain the law today.

4       100. Licenses are limited “to those over twenty-one years of age, of good moral  
 5 character, without a history of crime or mental illness, and ‘concerning whom no good cause  
 6 exists for the denial of the license.’ ” *Kachalsky v. County of Westchester*, 701 F.3d 81, 86  
 7 (quoting PL § 400.00(1).); NY Penal Law §§ 265.00, 265.01, 265.20(a)(3), 400.00. Persons  
 8 subject to a variety of protection orders are also prohibited from maintaining licenses. NY Penal  
 9 Law § 400.00(1); NY Criminal Procedure Law § 530.14; Family Court Act §842-a.

10       101. Every license application triggers an investigation into the applicant by local law  
 11 enforcement, including an investigation into the applicant’s mental health history.  
 12 PL § 400.00(4); *Kachalsky*, 701 F.3d at 87. Firearms subject to licensure must be disclosed to  
 13 and registered with licensing officials. N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00(7) (mandating that each license  
 14 “specify the weapon covered by calibre, make, model, manufacturer’s name and serial number,  
 15 or if none, by any other distinguishing number or identification mark . . . .”).

16       102. New York has also enacted specific criminal prohibitions on the possession of  
 17 rifles and shotguns by certain mentally ill individuals. PL §§ 265.01(6), 265.00(16). Penal Law  
 18 § 265.01(6), enacted in 1974, provides that “a person who has been certified not suitable to  
 19 possess a rifle or shotgun . . . and refuses to yield possession of such rifle or shotgun upon the  
 20 demand of a police officer” is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. Id.  
 21 § 265.01(6). Law enforcement is authorized to take firearms “possessed by such person.”

22       103. New York’s Secure Ammunition and Firearms Enforcement Act of 2013 (SAFE  
 23 Act) generally restricts the transfer and possession of “assault weapons”—defined, as a general  
 24 matter, as rifles, shotguns, and pistols that are (1) semiautomatic, (2) in the case of a pistol or

1 rifle, able to accept a detachable ammunition magazine, and (3) equipped with at least one feature  
 2 on an enumerated list of military style features. Penal Law § 265.00(22).[1] Possession of a  
 3 prohibited assault weapon constitutes the Class D felony of Criminal Possession of a Weapon in  
 4 the Third Degree. *Id.* § 265.02(7)-(8)<sup>9</sup>.

5       104. The Government’s “temporary modification” of the USML Category I to permit  
 6 “any United States person” to “access, discuss, use, reproduce, or otherwise benefit from” CAD  
 7 files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons quite literally nullifies the New  
 8 York’s laws prohibiting certain categories of persons from possessing firearms. If the “temporary  
 9 modification” is left in place, the New York stands to suffer extreme and irreparable  
 10 harm. Persons ineligible to possess firearms under New York law will easily be able to obtain  
 11 downloadable guns that they can produce at home using a 3-D printer. New York law  
 12 enforcement will have no means of detecting such weapons using standard equipment such as  
 13 metal detectors, and no means of tracing such weapons because they have no serial numbers.

14       6. **Oregon’s Firearms Laws**

15       105. Oregon law also limits the availability and manufacture of firearms to protect the  
 16 public safety and in the exercise of its police powers. Or. Rev. St. 166.170(1) provides: “[e]xcept  
 17 as expressly authorized by state statute, the authority to regulate in any matter whatsoever the  
 18 sale, acquisition, transfer, ownership, possession, storage, transportation or use of firearms or  
 19 any element relating to firearms and components thereof, including ammunition, is vested solely  
 20 in the Legislative Assembly.” Under this authority, the Oregon Legislature enacted Or. Rev. St.  
 21 166.410, which states that “[a]ny person who manufactures or causes to be manufactured within

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22       23       24       <sup>9</sup> The Act does not prohibit possession of any firearm that was lawfully possessed before the law’s effective date  
 of January 15, 2013. See Penal Law § 265.00(22)(g)(v). Persons who lawfully possessed a banned assault weapon  
 at that time may continue to do so, but must register the weapon with the Superintendent of the State Police. *Id.* §  
 400.00(16-a).]

1     this state, or who imports into this state, or offers, exposes for sale, or sells or transfers a handgun,  
 2     short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, firearms silencer or machine gun, otherwise than in  
 3     accordance with [the Oregon statutes] is guilty of a Class B felony.”

4                 106. Thus, Oregon law prohibits certain persons from obtaining or possessing  
 5     firearms. For example, Oregon law prohibits certain felons, certain individuals under the  
 6     jurisdiction of juvenile court, certain individuals with will mental illnesses and certain persons  
 7     subject to stalking orders from possession firearms. Or. Rev. St. 166.250; Or. Rev. St. 166.255.  
 8     Under Or. Rev. St. 166.470(1), it is unlawful to knowingly and intentionally sell, deliver or  
 9     otherwise transfer a firearm to such persons.

10                 107. Oregon law also has set up an extensive system of rules to ensure unauthorized  
 11     persons cannot buy firearms. For example, with certain exceptions (for example, transfers to  
 12     family members), only a gun dealer may transfer a firearm. Or. Rev. St. 166.435(2). A person  
 13     who applies to buy a handgun from a dealer must provide valid government identification  
 14     bearing a photograph and date of birth, and the dealer must complete a transaction record with  
 15     the signature of the purchaser. This transaction record much include the federal firearms license  
 16     number of the dealer, the business name of the dealer, the place of transfer, the name of the  
 17     person making the transfer, the make, model, caliber and manufacturer’s number of the handgun  
 18     and the type, the social security number of the purchaser, and the issuer and identification  
 19     number of the identification presented by the purchaser. The dealer must also obtain the  
 20     thumbprints of the prospective purchaser and contact the Department of State Police  
 21     (“Department”) to conduct a criminal background check. Or. Rev. St. 166.412; Or. Rev. St.  
 22     166.418.

23                 108. Oregon law also requires a request for a criminal background check to transfer a  
 24     gun at a gun show. Or. Rev. St. 166.433(2); Or. Rev. St. 166.438.

1           **7. Massachusetts' Firearms Laws**

2       109. Massachusetts carefully regulates the possession, licensing, and use of firearms  
 3 and other inherently dangerous weapons. Among the goals of these laws is limiting access to  
 4 deadly weapons by persons who may inflict harm – be it negligently or intentionally – on  
 5 themselves or others. These laws also recognize that criminal use of firearms is a significant  
 6 problem, that guns should be registered and traceable in the event of theft or criminal misuse,  
 7 and that possession of firearms should be limited to responsible persons who meet all  
 8 requirements for licensure. *See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reyes*, 464 Mass. 245, 250 (2013); *Jupin*  
 9 *v. Kask*, 447 Mass. 141, 153-154 (2006)

10      110. Under Massachusetts law,<sup>10</sup> a person may not possess or carry a firearm without  
 11 obtaining a license from the appropriate licensing authority. Persons may not obtain a license to  
 12 carry a firearm if they: (1) have committed certain offenses, including violent crimes and laws  
 13 regulating the use, possession, or sale of a controlled substance; (2) have been committed to a  
 14 hospital or institution for mental illness, or alcohol or substance misuse, subject to limited  
 15 exceptions; (3) were younger than 21 years old at the time of submitting an application; (4) are  
 16 currently subject to an order for suspension or surrender of firearms in connection with an abuse  
 17 prevention order; (5) have an outstanding arrest warrant in any state or federal jurisdiction; (7)  
 18 have been dishonorably discharged from the armed forces of the United States; (8) are a fugitive  
 19 from justice; or (9) have renounced their United States citizenship. M.G.L. c. 140, § 131(d).

20      111. A licensing authority also may deny a person a license to carry firearms if the  
 21 licensing authority determines that the person is unsuitable for a license based on: (i) reliable  
 22

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23           <sup>10</sup> The Massachusetts-specific allegations contained herein constitute a summary of some of the  
 24 most relevant provisions of Massachusetts law. It is not an exhaustive or complete list of all relevant  
 statutes, regulations, or other provisions.

1 and credible information that the applicant or licensee has exhibited or engaged in behavior that  
 2 suggests that, if issued a license, the applicant or licensee may create a risk to public safety; or  
 3 (ii) existing factors that suggest that, if issued a license, the applicant or licensee may create a  
 4 risk to public safety. M.G.L. c. 140, § 131(d).

5       112. Anyone who wishes to sell, rent, or lease firearms must apply for and obtain a  
 6 license. Such licenses are valid for three years. No license may issue until an investigation into  
 7 the applicant's criminal history has been completed. A licensee must record all sales of firearms  
 8 to include a complete description of the firearm (including the make and type of firearm) and the  
 9 person purchasing the firearm (including the person's sex, residence, and occupation). The police  
 10 may inspect the premises of a licensee at all times. M.G.L. c. 140, §§ 122-124. Reports of all  
 11 transactions must be made by licensees to Massachusetts's Department of Criminal Justice  
 12 Information Services with information that includes the make, model, serial number, caliber,  
 13 barrel length, and gun surface finish. 803 C.M.R. 10.00.

14       113. It is unlawful to manufacture a firearm in Massachusetts or to deliver a firearm  
 15 to a dealer in Massachusetts without a serial number permanently inscribed on a visible metal  
 16 surface of the firearm. M.G.L. 269, § 11E.

17       114. Anyone who purchases or obtains a firearm from any source other than a licensed  
 18 dealer must, within seven days of receiving the firearm, report in writing to the Commissioner  
 19 of the Massachusetts Department of Criminal Justice Information Services the name and address  
 20 of the seller or donor and the buyer or donee, together with a complete description of the firearm,  
 21 including the caliber, make, and serial number. M.G.L. c. 140, § 128B.

22       115. Only handguns that meet the safety and performance standards expressed in state  
 23 law and regulations, including protection against accidental discharge and explosion upon firing,  
 24 may be sold. M.G.L. c. 140D, § 123, clauses 18 to 20. The Secretary of the Massachusetts

1 Executive Office of Public Safety and Security has compiled an approved firearms roster,  
 2 pursuant to M.G.L. 140, § 131-3/4 and 501 C.M.R. 7.00.

3       116. It is unlawful to sell, offer for sale, transfer, or possess any weapon, capable of  
 4 discharging a bullet or shot, that is not detectable as a weapon or potential weapon by x-ray  
 5 machines commonly used at airports or walk-through metal detectors. M.G.L. c. 140, § 131N.

6       117. The sale, transfer, or possession of an “Assault weapon,” as defined in M.G.L. c.  
 7 140, § 121, is prohibited. M.G.L. c. 140, § 131M.

8       118. All firearms that are used in the commission of a crime must be traced by the  
 9 licensing authority for the city or town in which the crime took place. M.G.L. c. 140, § 131Q.

10       **8. Pennsylvania’s Firearms Laws**

11       119. Pennsylvania, like the other states, also has a robust system of state firearms laws  
 12 designed to keep the public safe and that would be undermined if the Government’s action is  
 13 allowed to stand. Section 6105 of the Pennsylvania’s Firearms Act mandates that any person  
 14 who has been convicted of certain enumerated offenses inside or outside of Pennsylvania  
 15 “regardless of the length of sentence” or whose conduct meets certain specified criteria “shall  
 16 not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to possess, use, control,  
 17 sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a). The  
 18 definition of “firearm” in section 6105 “shall include” any weapons which are “designed to or  
 19 may readily be converted to” expel any projectile by the action of an explosive or the frame or  
 20 receiver of any such weapon. 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(i). The “downloadable guns” that Defense  
 21 Distributed promises to make available constitutes a “firearm” under this section of the Firearms  
 22 Act because it is a weapon that is designed and, by 3D printing, “may readily be converted to”  
 23 expel bullets by an explosive. *Id.* Depending on the underlying offense or criteria, violation of  
 24 section 6105, by individuals who shall not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture the

1 Defendants' firearm in the Commonwealth is a second degree felony or first or third degree  
 2 misdemeanor. 18 Pa. C.S. § 6105(a)(1). Each firearm wrongly possessed by a felon constitutes  
 3 a separate offense.

4       120. By law, the State Police "shall have the responsibility to administer the provisions  
 5 of" Pennsylvania's Uniform Firearms Act, and are assigned certain specific duties thereunder.  
 6 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1.(a), (b). Among these duties, the State Police must: (1) review criminal  
 7 histories, delinquency histories, and mental health histories of potential firearms' purchasers or  
 8 transferees; make all reasonable efforts to identify the legal owner of any firearm confiscated or  
 9 recovered by law enforcement; (3) establish a telephone number for inquiries by licensed firearms  
 10 manufacturer, importers, and dealers; and (4) provide information regarding the firearms laws  
 11 and firearms safety. 18 Pa. C.S. § 6111.1

12       121. Section 6106 of the Firearms Act mandates, with limited exceptions, that, outside  
 13 of one's home or "fixed place of business," firearms may not be carried in the Commonwealth  
 14 "without a valid and lawfully issued license." 18 Pa. C.S. § 6106(a). Violation of this section  
 15 constitutes a third degree felony unless the unlawful carrier of the firearm is "eligible" to have a  
 16 valid license, in which case the violation is a first degree misdemeanor. *Id.*

17       122. Under section 6109 of the Firearms Act, a "license to carry a firearm" is required  
 18 to carry a concealed firearm "on or about one's person or in a vehicle throughout this  
 19 Commonwealth." 18 Pa. C.S. § 6109(a). In order to apply for a concealed carry license, you  
 20 must be "21 years of age or older" and the application itself must be "uniform throughout this  
 21 Commonwealth" and only "on a form prescribed by the Pennsylvania State Police." 18 Pa. C.S.  
 22 § 6109(b),(c). In filling out the application, the licensee must identify one of the following  
 23 reasons for applying for a firearm license: "self-defense, employment, hunting and fishing, target  
 24 shooting, gun collecting or another proper reason." 18 Pa. C.S. § 6109(c).

1       123. Applicants must also sign and date the following statement under penalty of  
 2 perjury, certifying that they have “never been convicted of a crime that prohibits [them] from  
 3 possessing or acquiring a firearm under Federal or State law,” are “of sound mind,” and “have  
 4 never been committed to a mental institution.” *Id.* Applicants must also authorize the relevant  
 5 law enforcement officials to research all records necessary to verify the certification and promise  
 6 to “promptly notify” them if they are issued a license but later “knowingly become ineligible to  
 7 legally possess or acquire firearms.” *Id.*

8       124. Then, before a license is issued, the sheriff must “conduct [an] investigation” of  
 9 the applicant including an investigation of the applicant’s “record of criminal conviction,”  
 10 whether or not the applicant “is under indictment for or has ever been convicted of a crime  
 11 punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year,” and has a “character and reputation” such that  
 12 the applicant “will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety.” 18 Pa. C.S. §  
 13 6109(d). The sheriff must also “conduct a criminal background, juvenile delinquency and  
 14 mental health check.” *Id.*

15       125. As can be seen, these various requirements and background checks serve to keep  
 16 Pennsylvanians safe by keeping guns out of the hands of those who should not have access to  
 17 them. This system, however, will be effectively nullified if those ineligible to buy or possess  
 18 firearms can avoid the legal prerequisites for lawful possession by simply printing an untraceable  
 19 gun at home or elsewhere.

20       **9. District of Columbia’s Firearms Laws**

21       126. The District of Columbia, like the States, has a comprehensive statutory scheme  
 22 regulating the possession, licensing, and registration of firearms. Certain types of weapons are  
 23 prohibited entirely.

1       127. District of Columbia law prohibits certain persons from registering firearms.<sup>11</sup>  
 2 For example, persons cannot register firearms if they have been acquitted by reason of insanity  
 3 within the last five years, or have been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to a mental  
 4 hospital or institution in that time. D.C. Code § 7-2502.03. Other persons prohibited from  
 5 registering firearms include persons convicted of a felony, persons with a history of violent  
 6 behavior, under indictment for a crime of violence or a weapons offense, or convicted within the  
 7 previous five years of: (a) use, possession, or sale of any narcotic or dangerous drug; (b) assault  
 8 or threats; (c) two or more impaired driving offenses; (d) intrafamily offenses punishable as  
 9 misdemeanors; or (e) stalking. D.C. Code § 7-2502.03(a)(2)–(4).

10       128. The District of Columbia also prohibits the registration of certain types of  
 11 firearms, including “unsafe” pistols, assault weapons, and .50 caliber firearms. D.C. Code §§ 7-  
 12 2502.02, 7-2501.01(3A)(A) (defining “assault weapon”).

13       129. One of the cornerstones of the District of Columbia’s firearms regulatory  
 14 structure is the use of background checks. All persons seeking to register a firearm (or obtain a  
 15 license to carry concealed) are subject to background checks. D.C. Code § 7-2502.04(a); § 22-  
 16 4506. The purpose of the background check is simple and obvious: to ensure that persons  
 17 prohibited by law from possessing firearms are unable to do so.

18       130. The Government’s “temporary modification” of the USML Category I to permit  
 19 “any United States person” to “access, discuss, use, reproduce, or otherwise benefit from” CAD  
 20 files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons quite literally nullifies the District of  
 21 Columbia’s laws prohibiting certain categories of persons from possessing firearms.

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22  
 23       <sup>11</sup> Registration is a prerequisite to firearm possession and carrying in the District of Columbia. D.C. Code  
 24 § 7-2502.01(a). See also D.C. Code § 22-4504 (license required to carry firearm within the District “either openly  
 or concealed”).

131. If the “temporary modification” is left in place, the District of Columbia stands to suffer extreme and irreparable harm. Persons ineligible to possess firearms under District of Columbia law will easily be able to obtain downloadable guns that they can produce at home using a 3-D printer, and even produce guns which are explicitly prohibited in the District because they are assault weapons such as the AR-15. See D.C. Code Sec. 7-2501.01(3A)(A) (defining assault weapons). District of Columbia law enforcement will have no means of detecting such weapons using standard equipment such as metal detectors, and no means of tracing such weapons because they have no serial numbers. In sum, the Government’s actions are an extreme infringement on the District of Columbia’s right to enact and enforce its public safety laws.

## **V. CAUSES OF ACTION**

**Count I:**

132. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as though fully set forth herein.

133. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), a court must set “aside agency action that is “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C).

134. The Government Defendants' enactment of a "temporary modification" of the USML Category I so as to deregulate CAD files used for the production of 3-D printed guns constitutes a final agency action that is *ultra vires* and should be set aside by the Court. Likewise, Defendants approval of the CAD files for public release and effective removal from USML Category I constitutes a final agency action that is *ultra vires* and should be set aside by the Court.

1       135. The Government Defendants may only exercise the authority conferred to them  
 2 by statute. Neither the AECA nor ITAR confer upon the Government Defendants the power to  
 3 modify the USML Category I, temporarily or otherwise, without 30 days' notice to the relevant  
 4 Congressional committees and without concurrence of the Defense Department.

5       136. Upon information and belief, the Government Defendants did not provide  
 6 advance notice of the proposed temporary modification to the House Committee on Foreign  
 7 Affairs and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, and did not receive the  
 8 concurrence of the Secretary of Defense, before enacting the modification on July 27, 2018.

9       137. According to Rep. Engel, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Foreign  
 10 Affairs, notice of the terms of the settlement has not been provided by the President or the State  
 11 Department. *See* "Engel Decries State Department Policy to Allow 3-D Gun Printing," Press  
 12 Release (July 20, 2018), available at <https://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/releases/engel-decries-state-department-policy-allow-3-d-gun-printing>, attached hereto as Ex. 8.

14       138. The Government Defendants also lack statutory authority to determine that the  
 15 Plaintiffs' CAD files should be removed from the Category I list and approval of the CAD files  
 16 for public release without following the "established procedures" for commodity jurisdiction.  
 17 This is especially relevant here because, in effect, the "temporary modifications" and approval  
 18 for public release at issue will negate—in large part—the need for final rulemaking with respect  
 19 to the data at issue, because once the data is on the internet, the damage to the national security  
 20 and public safety in the State of Washington will be irreparable.

21       139. In addition, although ITAR allows the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense  
 22 Trade Controls to order the temporary modification of any ITAR regulation, it may do so only  
 23 "in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the United States." 22 C.F.R. § 126.2.  
 24

140. The temporary modification enacted by DDTC on July 27, 2018 and the approval of the CAD files for public release sent the same day are not in the interest of the security and foreign policy of the United States, and, upon information and belief, Government Defendants have made no determination otherwise.

141. In addition, Government Defendants lack statutory authority to permit “any United States person” to “access, discuss, use, reproduce, or otherwise benefit” from CAD files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons, as this would allow “any United States person” to manufacture, possess, and sell firearms made from the files. As such, this provision would violate numerous provisions of Washington’s statutory scheme regulating firearms, including laws that promote public safety by keeping guns out of the hands of minors, persons convicted of violent felonies, the mentally ill, and persons subject to various protection and no-contact orders. For similar reasons, this provision would also violate numerous provisions of the federal Gun Control Act, including 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (prohibiting handgun possession by minors), § 922(g) (prohibiting firearm possession by felons and domestic abusers), and § 922(p) (prohibiting the manufacture of undetectable firearms). Government Defendants lack any authority to amend, rescind, or waive any portion of these laws.

142. For these reasons, the State of Washington is entitled to a declaration that the “temporary modification” is invalid, and an injunction requiring Government Defendants to rescind the temporary modification and restore the status quo until a proper administrative process is completed.

## Count II:

## **Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act—Action Not in Accordance with Law**

143. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as though fully set

forth herein.

144. Under the APA, a court must set aside agency action that is “not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

145. As alleged above, upon information and belief, Government Defendants did not give 30 days' notice to the required Congressional Committees or receive concurrence from the Secretary of Defense before enacting the "temporary modification" of USML Category I to remove the CAD files at issue from ITAR regulation on July 27, 2018 as well as the approval of the CAD files for public release on the same day.

146. Upon information and belief, Government Defendants also did not follow established procedures before granting Defense Distributed an exception to ITAR jurisdiction.

147. Furthermore, it is unlawful for Government Defendants to permit “any United States person” to “access, discuss, use, reproduce, or otherwise benefit from” CAD files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons, as this purports to allow prohibited individuals to possess, manufacture, and sell firearms made using such files, in violation of existing state and federal law.

148. For these reasons, the State of Washington is entitled to a declaration that the “temporary modification” is invalid, and an injunction requiring Government Defendants to rescind the temporary modification and restore the status quo until a proper administrative process is completed.

### Count III:

## **Violation of the Administrative Procedure Act—Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action**

149. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as though fully set

1 forth herein.

2       150. Under the APA, a court must set “aside agency action” that is “arbitrary,  
 3 capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law,” 5 U.S.C. §  
 4 706(2)(A).

5       151. A court may hold that an agency action is arbitrary and capricious when the  
 6 agency has failed to consider relevant evidence or articulate a satisfactory explanation for its  
 7 action. An agency’s departure from prior practice can serve as an additional basis for finding an  
 8 agency’s action to be arbitrary and capricious.

9       152. Upon information and belief, Government Defendants have provided no  
 10 explanation for the Government’s complete reversal of its position on the CAD files at issue.  
 11 The Government has released no reports, studies, or analyses to explain why CAD files for the  
 12 automated production of 3-D printed weapons should be removed from ITAR regulation or that  
 13 the files should be publically released. It appears that Government Defendants have also failed  
 14 to consider or acknowledge the serious national security concerns or the threat to public safety  
 15 posed to states, including the Plaintiff States, created by the export of the CAD files.

16       153. Government Defendants’ enactment of a “temporary modification” to exclude the  
 17 CAD files at issue from ITAR jurisdiction, the approval of the CAD files for public release, and  
 18 the agreement to permit “any United States person” to “access, discuss, use, reproduce, or  
 19 otherwise benefit from” the CAD files is arbitrary and capricious because the Government has  
 20 not offered a reasoned explanation for ignoring or countering its earlier factual  
 21 determinations. It is also arbitrary and capricious because it is contrary to the purposes of AECA,  
 22 which requires the State Department to administer AECA to reduce the international trade in  
 23 arms and avoid destabilizing effects abroad through arms export. *See* 22 U.S.C. § 2751. It is also

arbitrary and capricious because it is an extreme infringement of the Plaintiff States' sovereign right to exercise its police power by enacting and enforcing public safety laws that restrict certain persons' possession of firearms and provide for licensing and tracking gun ownership.

154. For these reasons, the Plaintiff States are entitled to a declaration that the “temporary modification” is invalid, and an injunction requiring Government Defendants to rescind the temporary modification and restore the status quo until a proper administrative process is completed.

**Count IV:**  
**Violation of the Tenth Amendment**

155. All of the foregoing allegations are repeated and realleged as though fully set forth herein.

156. The structure and limitations of federalism allow the States great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons. The police power is a critical function reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment.

157. While the regulation of health and safety is primarily and historically a matter of State and local concern, the Federal Government can set uniform national standards in these areas—but only if Congress makes its intent to alter the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government “unmistakably clear” in the language of the statute.

158. Government Defendants' enactment of a "temporary modification" to the USML permitting "any United States person" to "access, discuss, use, reproduce, or otherwise benefit from" CAD files for the automated production of 3-D printed weapons and the approval of the CAD files for public release purports to allow any U.S. citizen to manufacture and use an

1 undetectable and untraceable weapon—regardless of their age, mental health status, or criminal  
 2 history—in violation of Washington’s public safety laws.

3       159. Government Defendants’ action infringes on the Plaintiff States’ exercise of its  
 4 police power and enforcement of its safety laws, including (i) prohibiting certain United States  
 5 persons from possessing firearms—such as minors, persons convicted of violent felonies, the  
 6 mentally ill, and persons subject to various protection and no-contact orders; (ii) regulating the  
 7 acquisition and tracking the ownership of firearms; (iii) using serial numbers to trace weapons;  
 8 and (iv) keeping government buildings and other public places safe through the use of metal  
 9 detectors.

10      160. Government Defendants were not authorized by Congress to infringe upon the  
 11 Plaintiff States’ police power to this extreme degree, which is well outside the scope of any  
 12 authority delegated by AECA. Indeed, Government Defendants failed even to follow the  
 13 required administrative procedures before enacting the temporary modification, including  
 14 providing Congress with 30 days’ notice and obtaining the Secretary of Defense’s concurrence.  
 15 Rather, Government Defendants enacted the temporary modification unilaterally on July 27,  
 16 2018, completely reversing the Government’s previous position as to the CAD files at issue  
 17 while sidestepping Congressional review and flouting APA requirements.

18      161. As such, the State of Washington is entitled to a declaration that the “temporary  
 19 modification” is an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth Amendment, and an injunction  
 20 requiring Government Defendants to rescind the temporary modification and restore the status  
 21 quo until a proper administrative process is completed.

## **VI. PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

WHEREFORE, the State of Washington requests that the Court enter a judgment against Defendants and award the following relief:

- a. Declare that the “temporary modification” of the USML Category I and the approval of the CAD files for public release are unlawful and *ultra vires* agency action, including to the extent it purports to permit “any United States person” to “use, reproduce or otherwise benefit from” the files at issue in violation of state and federal law;
- b. Declare that the “temporary modification” of the USML Category I and approval of the CAD files for public release are an unconstitutional violation of the Tenth Amendment;
- c. Declare that the “temporary modification” of the USML Category I and approval of the CAD files for public release are null and void;
- d. Issue an injunction requiring Defendants to rescind the “temporary modification” of the USML Category I and to rescind the approval of the CAD files for public release;
- e. Issue an injunction prohibiting Defendants and anyone acting in concert with them from taking any action inconsistent with the rescission of the “temporary modification” of the USML Category I and the rescission of the approval of the CAD files for public release;
- f. Award the State its costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees; and
- g. Award such additional relief as the interests of justice may require.

Respectfully submitted this 30th day of July, 2018.

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23 ***Pro Hac Vice motions forthcoming for all***  
***counsel of record not barred in the Western***  
***District of Washington***

1                   **DECLARATION OF SERVICE**

2                   I hereby certify that on July 30, 2018, I electronically filed the foregoing document with  
3 the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will serve a copy of this document upon  
4 all counsel of record.

5                   DATED this 30th day of July, 2018, at Olympia, Washington.

6                   \_\_\_\_\_  
7                   */s/ Jeffrey Rupert*  
Assistant Attorney General